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Io INTRODUCTION 
Guaranteed wage plans in the United States are not 
new; they had their beginnings in 1894 when a jointly 
sponsored plan was initiated by the National Wallpaper 
Co. and the Machine Printers and Polor Mixers Union. 
Plans which were e££ective long before World War II include 
the Nunn-Bush Plan (1935), the Hormel Plan (1931), and the 
·Procter and Gamble Plan (192)). 
The current emphasis, however, was initiated in 1943* -
when the United Steelworkers of America attempted to nego-
tiate a guaranteed wage plan into collective bargaining 
agreements with the steel companies. Interest appeared 
to dwindle during the high employment years of and immedi-
ately following World War II, but was quickly revived when 
the 1951 United Auto Workers convention declared the guar-
anteed annual wage. to be that union's major collective 
b~rgaining objective.** 
Scores of reports and articles have been written by 
ostensibly unbiased academicians, by persons sympathetic 
with the management viewpoint, and by persons sympathetic 
to union objectiveso The issue was su££1ciently complex, 
timely, and significant to ~e chosen as the national colle-
giate debate topic for the academic year 1955 - 1956. 
; 
~ - ...,....._..~ :;:a:P 4JI!N • .. - ·- %;F.*. ,. fi !#l!ifA 
Many of the authors argued vehemently according 
to their bias (management or union) and came to definite 
conelusions, noting that their remarks would probably 
be substantiated after the mid-summer automobile contract 
negotiations in 1955o In any event, the majority of the 
authors claimed, the 1955 negotiations would be a key 
to future guaranteed annual wage trends, and hesitated to 
make any pre-negotiation .fotecasts as to the .future course 
of guaranteed wages. After the 1955 negotiations, however, 
there was and still is a definite lack of follow-up material 
concerning the future or guaranteed wages and the effects 
of the newly negotiated supplementa.l unemployment benefits 
programs on the automobile industry and on the economy. 
Material concerning the guaranteed annual wage is still 
popular in business magazines, company publications, and 
union publications, but it is mainly concerned with ex-
planations of the mechanics of the supplemental unemploy-
ment benefits plans rather than predictions and analyses 
of the effects of the plans. 
This paper, therefore, shall endeavor to analyze the 
supplemental unemployment benefits plans' effect on the 
automobile industry, the resultant effect on the economy 
o! the country, and the future course of guaranteed wage 
plans in this country. 
-- ---
Most of this study is related to an analysis of the 
supplemental unemployment benefits plans in the auto• 
mobile industry because that industry is the first major 
industry in which a form of guaranteed wage has been 
negotiatedo The rapidity with which guaranteed wage plans 
spread in ~lis country depends greatly upon the experiences 
of the automobile industry with the supplemental unemploy-
ment benefits program and the industry's role in triggering 
a chain of pattern-bargained contracts in other industries. 
The timeliness and significance of the growth of guar~ 
' 
anteed wage plans need hardly be elaborated ono The two 
foremost current objectives of unionism, the guaranteed wage 
and the reduced work-week, should be or concern to all, 
since the growth and policies of trade unionism a£fects 
the living habits and standards o£ nea~ly everyone in the 
country. 
Beeause of the eurrent nature of supplemental unem-
ployment benefits plans, source material is related to 
letters from management associations, unions, and companies 
• with guaranteed wage plans, interviews, government publica-
tions, and recent magazine articles. 
7 
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II~ DIFFERENTIATION OF GUARANTEED WAGE TYPES 
There have been many types of guaranteed wages 
negotiated and discussed since the issue became popular 
at bargaining tables and in academic circleso . However, 
all of the wage types fall into one of three eatagories; 
pure guaranteed annual wage plans, the United Auto Workers 
Union's original plan, and supplemental unemployment 
benefits plans. A clear distinction between the three 
types is necessary in Qrder to distinguish the social and 
economic impact of guaranteed annual wage plans from the 
impact of supplemental unemployment benef'its programs on 
the society and on the economyo 
A. Pure Guaranteed Annual Wage Plans 
A pure guaranteed annual wage is exactly what the name 
implies; the employer obligates himself to provide a full 
year's pay to all or a specif'ied group of employees wheth-
er those employees work a full year or noto This is the 
very controversial type of plan which has been the subject 
of voluminous critical writing and debates. The Hormel 
Co. has essentially a pure guaranteed annual wage program~ 
Under the Hor.mel agreement each worker is guaranteed 52 
pay checks per year, each check being equal to at least 
the worker's standard hourly rate times 38, or 1976 hours 
annually.* 
* 26, p. 11 
------
-- - ---- -- ~--~ - -
B, The United Auto Workers' Original Plan 
Union preparations for the guranteed wase proposals 
began long before the 1955 negotiations in the automobile 
induetryo During these preparations, the United Auto 
Workers;¥ d.evised a wage program which called £or a guar-
antee of income for a full year to "seniority" employees. 
The income, equivalent to the worker's average take-home 
pay, was to be composed o£ both state unemployment compen• 
sat1on payments and payments from the employer.* This 
plan will be discussed more fully in chapter IVa 
c. The Supplemental Unemployment Benefits Plan 
The supplemental unemployment benefit~ plans are 
essentially the same as the United Auto Workers' original 
plan, but entail three important differences. First, the 
duration o£ benefits are for less than one year. Second, 
the amount of benefits are less than the average take-home 
pay of the worker. ':.Third, the financing of the plans 
allows the employer to roughly compute the wage cost added 
by the program, which, under the United Auto Workers' 
original proposal, was largely indeterminable. Most supp-
I lemental unemployment benefits programs are an outgrowth 
# International Union, United 'Automobile, Aircraft and 
Agricultural Implement Workers of America ••• hereafter 
referred to as "United Auto Workers" • 
• 38 
9 
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of the plan negotiated at the Ford Motor Company, which 
shall be discussed in detail in Chapter IVo 
10 
--
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III. RESUME OF GUARANTEED ANNUAL WAGE PROBLEMS 
The purpose of this thesis does not permit a detailed 
analysis o£ all the various argUments for and against the 
guarant~ed annual wagee However, a knowledge o£ a few 
of the most important controversies is an absolute requi-
site to an understanding of the supplemental unemployment 
plans which were fathered by the guaranteed annual wage 
proposals. The guaranteed annual wage controversies are 
stated factually for background information; in chapter 
VIII the arguments will be critically evaluated with 
respect to the supplemental unemployment benefits agree-
ments. It must be borne in mind that the following argu-
ments apply only to the guaranteed annual wage and in many 
cases do not apply to the supplemental unemployment benefits 
plans. 
A. Arguments Unfavorable to the Guaranteed 
Annual Wage 
lo Effect on investment and expansion 
Investment is the vehicle in which industrial expan-
sion moves; expansion in turn creates new products, new 
jobs, and flows fresh money into the economy. The ulti-
mate effect of investment is to raise the standard o£ 
living in the economy~ Whethe~ automation and industrial-
ism have been advantageous from a moral and social viewpoint 
11 
is the subj"ect of frequent discussion. The merits of in-
vestment, however, are so positive as to be above criticism. 
It follows, then, that if the guaranteed annual wage 
should tend to retard investment, there would be a defi-
nite detrimental effect on the ·economy" The opponents 
of the guaranteed annual wage contend that such a wage 
program would retard investment for the following three 
reasons. First, employers would be hesitant to hire new 
employees to carry out an expansion program of existing 
facilities.- The employers would be well aware of the 
wage costs involved if the expansion project were to 
meet with unexpected diftic~ties that forced its abandon-
ment. It could well mean business death for the firm if 
it was obligated to pay a year's wages to a large number 
of idle workers. Second, the decision to invest in a 
new venture would be dampened in much the same way. The 
group financing the new venture would justifiably want 
some kind of proof that the business would not be termi~ 
nated abruptly and leave them with a large .group of idle 
\'IIOrkers demandi11g a full year's pay. Third, the incentive 
for company-sponsored research would be reduced. Many o£ 
the products developed through research are produced on 
a trial basis~ The guaranteed annual wage would tend to 
increase the "calculated risk" involved in the production 
of the new product and in some cases prevent experience 
12 
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with th~ product. This being true, the research depart-
ments of many small companies (an expensive luxury if its 
cost is not justified in terms of dollars added to net 
income through sales of newly developed products) might 
be dropped completely, and the research departments of 
I 
the large companies would take on a reduced significance 
and a reduced departmental budget. The ultimate effect 
of the foregoing would be to reduce technological advance-
ment of products and methods of producing products, a 
force which has been the determining factor in raising the 
standard of living in this country to what it is today. 
2. Effect on automation 
Opponents of the advancement of automation argue 
that mechanization of' the work process is changing the 
worker from a contented and respected craftsman to a 
thoughtless button-pusher with a monotonous wo~k life. 
However, it is believed that the adverse effects ot auto-
mation are more than offset by its positive effects. 
Automation has permitted the worker more leisure with \1hich 
to enjoy his ~ncreased real earnings in any way which he 
""' 
sees fito Since automation is basically the substitution 
of machinery for labor, it necessarily follows that any 
plan which makes it more costly to displace labor will re-
tard the installment of automatic machinery. Should 
l) 
-- --- --· -
management have to pay a full year's wage to the labor 
which the machinery displaces, the decision to replace 
workers with labor-saving equipment will not be ~Js un-
less the efficiency of the machine is such that it of.fsets 
the added w~ge cost or unless the labor is sufficiently 
mobile to be transferred to another type of work • 
. --.., 
3 :o · Cyclical effect 
During prosperity, when low unemploymel,;, prevails, 
guaranteed annual wage payments by firms would be compara-
tively low. It is at that time, however, when marginal 
firms would be in a financial position to withstand the 
cost burden of the guaranteed annual wage. During a 
period of recession, when unemployment is usually higtl, 
the cost of guaranteed annual wage payments to employers 
would be at its peak. It is feared that the added wage 
costs will be sufficient to force marginal firms out of 
business prematurefy during recessi<;>n and result in 
ag~ravation of the recessional cycle, possibly culmina-
ting in tull depression as more and more people are 
thrown out or work by the bankrupted .firms4 Basically 
then, the gist of' the "cyclical effects" argument is 
that when the owners of' the factors of production can 
af'ford the burden of a guaranteed annual wage, the cost 
is negligible. On the other hand, the burden is heaviest 
14 
when the employers can least afford the added cost and 
the marginal firms may plunge into premature bankruptcy 
which would serve to aggravate recession toward depres-
sion. 
4. Plant flexibility 
Adam Smith's nunseen hand" theory stated that con-
sumers, by indicating their consumption preferences by 
dollar votes at the market place, would cause the produc-
tion of the optimum product composition. One of the 
assumptions of the theory is that factors of production 
be flexible, i.e., be able to move freely from·the pro-
duction of one good to. another good in order to produce 
according to the changing desires of the consumers. The 
advantages of flexibility are two-fold. First, as indi-
cated above, optimum product composition is attained, as 
nearly as possible. Second, the producer of a good for 
which demand decreases (due to a multitude of reasons, 
such as technological changes, style changes, or raw 
material depletion or cost change) may convert his pro- , 
duction facilities in order to tak~ advantage of a more 
lucrative proaU:ct, thus avoiding bankrup~cy. Opponents 
of guaranteed wages contend that a guaranteed annual 
wage would tend to reduce plant flexibility by imposing 
15 
the cost of a full year's wages on any producer that 
attempts to change his product, assuming that the. same 
employees are not used in the production of the new item. 
Therefore. the guaranteed annual wage might cause a less 
satisfactory composition of goods and force some producers 
out of business who might have shifted their production 
facilities to other product lines. 
So Effect on state unemployment 
compensation systems 
That guaranteed annual wage plans will effectively 
sabotage state unemployment compensation systems is a 
charge frequently made by the opponents of guaranteed 
wages. Unemployment compensation systems attempt to 
alleviate financial suffering by people unemployed 
through no fault of their own and who are willing to 
work. In order to attain this goal, the compensation 
systems are based on certain principles of public policy, 
two of which follow: (1) The amount of benefits paid to 
the recipient of the compensation should be sufficiently 
below the wage which the person is capable of earning, 
so that the person will have an incen~ive to seek work 
rather ~han drawunemployment 'compensation. 
16 
(2) The duration of the benefits should be limited to 
further encourage the person to look for work during the 
period of unemployment compensation receipt.* It is 
obvious that widespread guaranteed annual wage plans 
would effectively nullify the work of the state unemploy-
ment systems. The guaranteed wage plans would supply 
the laid-lff worker with full pay fo~ a year and effective-
ly nulli.fy ·the above listed principles which the state 
systems are founded upon. 
6. Effect on employee initiative 
It is argued that the ambition and initiative of 
many employees will be dampened by a guaranteed annual 
wage. It is reasonable toassume that some employees 
who would normally be searching for better employment 
will be hesitant to leave the safety of a guaranteed job 
and assume the risk o£ failing at a different type of 
work. This is particularly true of men with a heavy 
family responsibility. 
B. Arguments Favorable to the 
Guaranteed Annual Wage 
1. Effect on investment and expansion 
Persons s1mpathetic \'lith union causes are quick to 
* 2s P• 17 
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repudiate the charge that the guaranteed annual wage will 
retard investment and expansiono They point out that 
employers will not hesitate to hire additional employees 
in conjunction with an expansion of existing production 
facilities because if the expansion project should fail, 
the employer would have little or no financial obligation 
to the lo\1 seniority workers.* Ti1is argument assumes 
tha.t unions will be unable or perhaps even unwilling to 
negotiate a full guaranteed annual wage for workers 
with little or no seniority. For the same reason, 
and under the same assumption, investment captial 
for new business ventures should not be reduced, since 
the. employer would have only negligible financial re-
sponsibility for the low seniority worker in the event 
the venture turned sour. Professor Sumner Slichter of 
Harvard University recognizes a factor which, i£ true, 
would negate many theories contending that a guaranteed 
annual wage would foster cautious hiring, investment, 
and expansion. He holds that as long as firms have orders 
for goods 1 they will not be hesitant to hire; the adven-
turesome spirit characteristic of a dynamic economy will 
not be dampened.** 
* 10, P• 5 
** 14t po 66 
<' 
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2. E.ffect on technological advancement. 
Proponents of the guaranteed-annual wage contend that 
technological advancement would in no way be reduced by 
guaranteed annual wage plans. They argue that cases 
where technological improvements result in drastic labor 
requirement reductions are rare, but when they do occur, 
the savings resulting from the improvements are so sub-
stantial as to more than compensate the firm for any 
loss caused by wages paid to laid-of£ workers.* Also. 
the problem or workers being displaced by technological 
improvements is not as severe as the layman might believe; 
experience has shown that scientific advancement in 
methods of production and in products have resulted in 
increased rather than decreased employment. The fact 
that the cost of research activities are deducted .from 
profit before taxes makes the real cost of the activities 
only a fraction of the amount actually spent be the depart-
ment. This, along With the businessmante willingness 
to gamble ~ith a research department in the hope of making 
a really pro.fitable discovery, acts as a deterrent against 
any decision to discontinue research operations. 
* 12, Po 5 
)o Counter~cyclical effect 
To finance a guaranteed annual wage~ the producer 
would have no choice but to set up a sizeable .fund or 
reserve with which to make wage payments to laid-of£ 
workers when necessary. A fUnd or reserve would be a 
compulsory measure for the .firm because the guaranteed 
annual wage payments constitute an unpredictable liabil• 
ity both in regard to.· size and time of payment; there:fore 
if an employer attempted to .finance a guaranteed annual 
wage obligation on a full pay-as-you go basis, he would 
run a very strong risk of depleting his current assetl$ ,~. 
during a period o.f lay-off, a time when he would most. 
desire to be in a strong cash position. The accumulation 
· and disbursement of such reserves would be counter-
cyclical in nature*; collection taking place in periods 
of prosperity (high product demand, high production, 
low unemployment} and the spending of such reserves 
taking place in periods of recession9 Thus, money would 
be diverted from the economy when it might only add to 
inflationary prices; the same money would be added to 
the economy in periods of declini,ng prices and ser7e to 
bolster a sagging demando This ar~ent is lent added 
validity by the fact that the recipients of the guarantee 
* 9, P• 1 
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payments will have a higher than average marginal pro-
pensity to consume and will in all probability spend the 
wage payments at a .fast rate, thereby increasing product 
demand in a period o£ recession with a minimum of time 
lag. To the proposition that the added costs of a 
guaranteed wage will be sufficient to force marginal 
firms out of business prematurely during recession and 
result in aggravation of a business downturn, advocates 
o£ the guaranteed annual wage reply that the cost o£ the 
guarantee is an avoidable cost, i •'e., a firm need only 
take measures to reduce lay-offs in order to reduce the-
guaranteed annual wage bill. An example of a possible 
measure to reduce lay-offs would be to produce for stock 
in periods or slack demand instead or cutting back prQ-
duction to conform with a drop in product demand. 
4tt Automation fostered 
Professor Slichter contends that automation will 
not be retarded by guaranteed annual wage plans; in fact 
it will be fostered. Since the guarantees will have the 
effect of changing labor from a variable to a fixed cost, 
the guaranteed annual wage reduces oreo£ the'advantages 
of labor over machines, i.e., the opportunity to vary 
its cost.,~Ct This fact could persuade managenent to install 
* 14, Po 65 
- -- --
machinery in an expansion situat.ion rat.her than hire 
additional workers. Thus the rate of substitution of 
machines for men would be quickened. 
5. Cost savings £or the £irm 
The purpose of' guaranteed wages is not to supply 
out-of-work employees with free pay, but to insure that 
the employees will not be out of work. Therefore guar-
anteed annual wage plans will be designed to financially 
penalize the employer who resorts to hiring and firing 
employees as a means of varying production (viewing labor 
as a variable cost) and reward the employer who maintains 
a steady workforce (viewing labor as a fixed cost)o If 
the monetary incentive is sufficiently strong to force 
producers to stabilize production and employment, a 
considerable cost saving should result. Personnel hiring 
and training costs, overtime costs, and costs resulting 
from inadequate production scheduling should all be sub-
stantially reduced. 
22 
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IVo BACKGROUND.OF THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY SUPPLEMENTAL 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS PLAN 
A. Union Preparations 
Although the United Auto Workers was the first union 
to negotiate an industry-wide guaranteed wage agreement, 
other unions and union leaders were deeply interested 
in jobless pay plans. In early 1955, Mr. George Meany 
addressed a United Auto Workers - Congress of Industrial 
Organization convention in Cleveland that unanimously 
agreed to a.temporary dues tlike for the purpose of rais-
ing a twenty-five million dollar guaranteed wage strike 
fund. The fact 'that Mr. Meany, president of the then 
rival American Federation of Labor supported the United 
Auto Workers' guaranteed wage drive dramatizes the inter-
est and backing of all unions on the topict* 
Preparations by the United Auto Workers for the 
guaranteed annual wage began more than four years prior 
to the.l955 negotiations. Originally termed "guaranteed 
annual wage", the United Auto \tlorkers changed the name 
to nguaranteed employment plan" to avoid unfavorable 
connotations of the former term. Guaranteed wages 
were designated the United Auto Workers major collective 
bargaining objective at its 1951 and 1953 conventionso 
:0:.21, P• 6 
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A detailed plan was prepared by staff specialists and 
union officials; the plan was then revised by an advisory 
committee of university economists and authorities in 
the field of social security.* The plan was publicized 
by means of speeches, debates, and easily obtainable 
literature. The educational program was directed at 
union members, management, and the public. The purpose 
of the publication of the principles (facts and figures 
of the plan were withheld for reasons of negotiation 
expediency) of the plan, according to union sources,** 
was to obtain constructive criticism and to give manage. 
ment a chance to study the effects of the plan upon their 
individual companies in order to prevent negotiation 
proceedings of unnecessary length. 
B. The Automobile Industry's Susceptivity to 
Guaranteed Wage Agreements 
Whether a guaranteed wage agreement should have 
been negotiated in the automobile industry was debatable; 
but whether some form of. guaranteed wage would be negoti-
ated was hardly controversial. The automobile industry 
was tailor-made for the negotiators. 
1. Competition 
The Ford Motor Company had spent nineteen years in 
an effort to overtak~' Chevrolet in sales. In 1954 Ford 
finally went ahead i? retail sales over Chevrolet. It 
was a hard-won sales/supremacy and Ford obviously did 
\ ; 
not want to sacrifice its position as number one car 
in the low price field~ Ford management well. remembered 
the one hundred and four·day strike sustained by the 
Chrysler Corporation that cost that· company the number 
two position in the industry in 1950•* Ford, then 11 
the United Auto Workers must have realized, wanted indus• 
trial peace at almost any price~ The General Motors 
Corporation was in much the same position, for it certain-
ly did not want to lose sales ground to Fordo Moreover, 
the golden bank book of that corporation made it diffi-
cult for its negotiators to plead insufficient funds 
when fac.ed with new plans calling for increased wage 
costs. Also. General.Motors has been deftly avoiding 
anti-trust suits charging the corporation with monopoly 
practices; a major strike would only serve to £oGus atten-
tion on its corporate·practices and importanceo The 
strike mentioned above, plus admittedly poor body styling 
had cost Chrysler its traditional share of the automobile 
* 21, P• 6 
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market. In 1954 a do-or-die drive to regain lost sales 
was begun; a strike would have been most unwelcome at 
the Chrysler plants in 1955o 
The smaller manufacturers had only recently post-
poned business death by merging with one another. The 
~ 
Studebaker - Packard Corporation was very unhealthy 
financially until the Curtiss-Wright Corporation rescued 
them; even with the new funds the Packard line has been 
temporarily discontinuedo The American Motors Corpora-
tion (Hudson - Nash) seems still to be plagued with the 
mechanical, styling, and distribution problems that 
were theirs pre-merger. 
In general, the automobile industry presented a 
picture of scared giants and struggling midgets, none 
of which felt that they could withstand the blow of a 
major strike. This made the United Auto Workers job some-
what easier than it first appeared!!! 
... 
C9 Importance of the Automobile Industry 
Guaranteed Wage to Unions 
A form of guaranteed wage in the automobile industry 
is of great tactical importance to unions in general. As 
will be discussed in Chapter VI 1 passenger car production 
fluctuates sharply~ It a guaranteed wage could be success-
fully initiated and applied in this industry; other 
26 
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industries could not plead non-applicability due to pro-
duction rate problems when approached with guaranteed 
wage negotiations~ This serves to deprive management 
negotiators of one of their most effective weapons against 
guaranteed wages and fosters intra•industry pattern bar~ 
gaining. The effect would have been greatly minimized had 
the guaranteed wage first been negotiated in an industry 
with stable production rates .. 
D~ Negotiations at The Ford Motor Company 
lo Original plan of the union* 
Before discussing the negotiation proceedings and the 
supplemental unemployment benefits plan that emerged from 
the negotiations, it.will be help.ful to become acquainted 
with the original objective of the United Auto Workers, 
which, with only slight modification, is also their current 
objective. 
ao The guarantee 
(1) All available employees are guaranteed forty 
straight time hours of work per week at regular wages 
unless notified in advance of a full week lay-off. 
(2) When full week lay-of£ advance notice is given, 
seniority employees receive an amount sufficient to 
27 
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maintain their standard of livingo Payments are to be 
integrated with state unemployment compensation paymentsc 
bo Coverage 
(l) All employees are covered against being laid-
off for a full week without advance noticeo 
(2) Seniority employees are covered against all 
lay-o.ffs whether advance notice is received or not~ 
c. Duration of guarantee payments 
(1) The forty·hour guarantee has the duration of 
the contract. 
(2) The·guarantee against full week lay-offs will 
be effective for up to fift.y ... two weeksQ For seniority 
employees, credit to receive payment for o~e week while 
laid-off is accumulated at the rate of one credit unit 
for each two weeks worked in which the employees received 
pay. Employees are entitled to the unused balance of 
guaranteed weeks~~ 
d. Eligibility 
(1) The laid-off employee must'be eligible for 
unemployment compensation by the standards of the state · 
employment serviceo The employee is required to register 
with and accept "suitable" employme~t of£ered by the state 
employment service"' An employee accepting other employme:nt 
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is .still entitled to guarantee payments from the original 
company if again unemployed. 
e. Amount of bene.fi ts 
(1) Benefits shall in all oases be equal to 100~ 
of the average take-home pay of the employee (after taxes)o 
An average hourly rate will be computed for piece workers. 
(2) Payments by the employer shall be added to 
state unemployment compensation. payments by the state in 
order to bring the employee's income:~ to :'full .former take-
home level .. 
f. Financing 
(l) The coat o.f short work-weeks or failure to 
notify in advance of a full week lay~o££ must be met on 
a pay-as•you go basis; not creditable against maximum 
liability. 
(2) The cost of .full week lay-of£ payments will be 
met by the employer on a pay-as-you go basis up to a 
specified maximum percentage of current payroll. The 
specified maximum percentage of current payroll is to 
constitute the employer's maximum liability. 
(3) The vagueness of the following point is caused 
• 
by secrecy necessary to suceessfull future negotiations; 
the union is understandably hesitant to publish their plan 
in full. The employer will establish a reserve trust fUnd 
~. . '!· 
:.,.., ~· ';:' ··"", 
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and contribute- a percentage o£ annual base payroll to it 
in order to raise the fund to a percentage of annual 
base payroll to be used to meet liabilities in excess o£ 
(2) above. The difference between the maximum liability 
(stated in {2} above) and actual payments is to be contrib-
uted:ito the reserve trust fund. After the reserve trust 
fund reaches the specified percentage of annual base pay-
roll, further contributions will be necessary only to 
replace withdrawal~,· adjust to annual._payroll increases, 
and to adjust reinsurance rate changes or changes in un-
employment compenaation~laws. 
g. Adnl.inistration 
( 1) A joint board composed o£ an equal number of 
management and union representatives plus an impartial 
chairman will administer the plan~ 
2. Negotiation proceedings 
The union wanted to cQncentrate their bargaining 
power at the Ford negotiations, for reasons previously 
stated. Walter Reuther, president o£ the United Auto 
Workers, requested and received permission from General 
Motors and £rom American Motors to extend the contract 
expiration dates or those two companies to a time after 
the contract e~iration date of the Ford Motor Company. 
JO 
Thus Mr. Reuther shifted negotiations to Ford, although 
bargaining on a reduced scale continued at the other 
companies.* 
Negotiations at Ford started on April 12, 1955; the 
-
contract was due to expire June 1, 1955o Soon after the 
union had presented its demand for the guaranteed annual 
wage, Ford negotiators counter-proposed With the "Ford 
Partnership in Prosperity Program'' which consisted of 
a savings and stock participation plan, non-interest bear-
ing loans to assist employees to stabilize their incomes, 
and a separation allowance graduated by length of serviceo 
The proposal was refused by the union on May 26, with the 
strike deadline only six days away. On May 31, the company 
proposed a supplemental unemployment benefits plan which 
it had been reportedly developing for two years. The 
strike deadline was June 6; the union accepted the company 
proposal at noon on the deadline date.** 
)v The Ford Supplement~! Unemployment 
Benefits Plan 
Both union and management claimed victory at the 
bargaining table. The substance or the Ford supplemental 
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unemployment benefits plan follows; the format used to 
explain the union's original plan is also used here to 
facilitate comparison. Major points of difference be-
tween the two plans will be commented on during the dis-
cussion. 
a. The guarantee 
(l) All employees with at least one full year's 
seniority are guaranteed forty straight time hours of 
work per week at regular wages. The stipulations found 
in the original union plan concerning pay-as-you go 
benefits to all employees not notified of full week lay~ 
offs are absent from the agreement~ There are no benefits 
whatsoever accruing to employees with less than a year's 
seniority, whether notified of a full week lay-off or noto 
b. Coverage 
(1) All employees with one year's seniority are 
covered by the agreement. Payments were not made until 
one year from the date of the contract; this gave non-
seniority employees opportunity to gain seniority prior 
to the effective date of the first benefit payments. 
c. Duration of gurarantee payments 
(l) The duration of benefit payments varies accord-
ing to the trust fund position (percentage of maximum 
amount in the trust fund) at the time of lay-off and the 
number of ~credit units" the individual employee has 
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acquired through number o£ weeks workede The credit 
unit system is merely a means of translating employee 
service into benefit eligibility and duration. An 
employee with less than ten year's seniority acquires 
one quarter credit unit for each week in which at least 
thirty-two hours are worked; an employee with ten or 
more year's seniority acquires one~ha1£ credit unit for 
· each week in which at least thirty-two hours are worked6 
Credit units are sacrificed by employees as they apply 
.for and receive benefits" When the position of the trust 
fund is low, more credit units are given up per week's 
benefit obtained. Aa can be seen on Oha.rt .I, page 34, 
persons with equal seniority (<a:ssume .fifteen to twenty 
years) would sacrifice varying amounts of credit units 
i.f application for benefits was made at ·periods with 
different trust fund· positions" For example,. if worker 
"A".applied .for benefits while the trust .fundposition 
was at 60%, he need sacrifice only one credit unit per 
week's benefit received~ However~ if worker "B" applied 
for benefits while the trust fund position was at 20%, 
he would be required to give up two credit units for the 
same benefit, even though each worker was of the same 
senioritYe . This stipulation is a safeguard against 
unnecessary drains on the fund while the fund is low and 
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CHART I CREDIT Jl!!!! .,;.;TA=B;.;;;;L .... E* 
If' the Trust Fund 
Position applicable And if' the seniority of the person 
to the week for to whom such Benefit is ~aid is: . 
which such Benefit 1-5 5-10 lO·lS l$-20 20-25 2$ Years 
is paid is: Years Years X ears Years Years !.rut Over 
The Credit Units canceled tor such 
Benefit shall be: 
85% or over 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
76 - 84.99% 1.11 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
67 - 75.99% 1.25 1.11 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
58 - 66.99% 1.4) 1.25 1.11 1.00 1.00 1.00 
49 ... 57.99% 1.67 1.4) 1.25 l.ll 1.00 1.00 
40 - 48.99% 2.00 1.67 1.43 1.25 1.11 1.00 
31 - 39.99~ 2.50 2.00 ·1.67 1.43 1.25 1.11 
22 "" )0.99% ).)) 2.50 2.00 1.67 1.43 1.2; 
13 - 21.99% ;.oo ).33 2.50 2.00 1.67 1.43 
4 - 12.99% 10.00 ;.oo 3.33 2.50 2.00 1.67 
Under 4% ----------------·----No Benefit Payable--"~--
JCil :o}t P• 142 
( 
cannot sustain payments; it deters workers from applying 
for .funds during periods.o£ low trust fund position" Also., 
credit units sacri.ficed:for benefits are graduated in 
favor of high seniority employees~~ As indicated on table 
I, with the trust .fund position at 50%, a person with 
twenty to twenty-five years seniority would give up only 
.one credit unit for each week's benefits received, while 
a person with one to five year's seniority would be re-
quired to give up 1.67 credit units for the same benefito 
Under no circumstances will the duration of benefit 
payments exceed twenty-sixweeksiil The union's original 
plan called for a guaran~ee of fifty-two week's duration. 
do Eligibility 
(l) One year's seniority is required before an 
employee can participate in the plan!) 
(2) Standards of eligibility of the state employ• 
ment service must be met. 
(3) .No benefits will be paid to employees laid-o.tf 
due to labor disputes involving company employees or 
property, or by acts of God• enemy action or sabotage. 
e" Amount o£ benefits 
(i) Benefits paid by the company will be suf£icient, 
when added to state unemployment compensation, to give the 
employee an amount equal to sixty percent o£ his average 
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-take-home pay. These are called "regular benefits" and 
have a duration of up to twenty-two weeks• It will be 
remembered that the union plan called for a benefit 
amount equivalent to one-hundred percent of take-home 
pay. The purpose of' the sixty and sixty-five percent 
benefit level is· to provide a substantial pay differen-
tial in favor of those who remain at work, and to give 
the dismissed employee incentive to find other employment 
during the lay-off period.~ 
(2) Under no circumstances will the benefit be 
less than two dollars or more than twenty-five dollars. 
t. Financing 
(1) The company contributes five cents per man 
hour compensated to the trust fund. All payments related 
to the supplemental unemployment benefits program are 
made from the trust fund, including costs of administer- · 
ing the program. The five cent contributions constitute 
the sole liability and allow the company to predict its 
wage liability. In the absence of limited and predict-
able liability the company's complicated cost accounting, 
forward financial planning and pricing divisions would 
find their effectiveness and accuracy reduced. 
(2) A limitation, called "maximum £undingn has also 
been placed on the total amount o£ money to be built up 
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in the trust fund. Based on current em~~e¥ment employ-
ment levels (140 1 000 hourly-rated workers) the maximum 
.funding was set at fifty-five million dollars (roughly 
$400 per worker) on June 1, 19;;., Every month a new 
maximum fUnding amount will be computed. It will vary 
upward or downward in proportion to increases or de-
creases in the number of hourly-rated employees. Company 
contributions to the fund will cease when maximum fund-
ing is reached and further contributions will be necessary 
only to restore the level. This feature supplies the 
incentive for the company to maintain a constant work-
force. for fewer dismissals will result in fewer drainages 
from the fund and hasten maximum fUnding, at which point 
company contributions cease. 
g. Administration 
(1) The company retains control over the selection 
or the trustees for the funds and in the investment of 
the contributions. 
(2) A board of administration consisting ot three 
company members, three union members, and an impartial 
chairman perform certain designated administrative 
functions; its primary duty is to rend~r final decisions 
on appeals made by benefit claimants. The board does 
not have the power to dec~de questions which are the 
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jurisdiction of state unemployment compensation agencies; 
it has no separate staff or facilities of its own. This 
is a muoh weaker board than that proposed by the union's 
original plan. Ford negotiators were determined not to 
encroach on the domain of state unemployment compensa-
tion agencies or to establish administrative machinery 
that would duplicate the work of the state agencies.* 
E 1,) Effect of the Ford Agreement on the 
Rest of the Industry 
1. Intra-industry pattern bargaining refers to 
the practice of a number of firms agreeing to contract 
terms similar to those previously negotiated in a lead-
ing firm of the same industry. In chapter VII examples 
and effects of inter-industry pattern bargaining (whole 
industries agreeing to contract terms previously nego-
tiated in a dif.ferent industry} will be discussed. 
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The Ford supplemental unemployment benefits program 
afforded an excellent example or intra-industry pattern 
bargaining. Immediately after the Ford agreement of June 6, 
Walter Reuther joined United Auto Workers' vice president 
-, 
John Livingston at the General Motors negotiations. One 
week later a settlement similar to the Ford supplemental 
unemployment benefits plan was signed.** Three months 
gc 7, P• 6 
** 22, Pv 69 
after the Ford agreement 900,000 out of a total 
l,soo,ooo workers in the automobile industry were cover-
ed by s~rpi:lar supp::\,e:ql~ntal unemployment benefits agree-
ments.* As soon as a fi:··m's union contract expired, a 
supplemental unemployment benefits agreement was negotia• 
ted, without exception. 
2. Automobile industry contract differences 
Once the terms of the wage agreements had been 
hammered out at the Ford Company, it was difficult for 
negotiators of other companies to substantially change 
the plan. The lack of major differences in the supple-
mental unemployment benefits plans in the automobile 
industry serves to dramatize the ettect of the Ford 
agreement on the rest of the industry. 
a,. In order to equalize labor costs ·(~With reapect 
to the supplemental plans) in the indust,ry, all automo• 
bile industry supplemental unemployment benefits plans 
contain: 
(l) a uniform contribution rate of five cents per 
man hour compensated (with the sole exception o£ Willy's 
Motors, Inc.) .. 
(2) benefits are cal'Culated tor all companies 
according to the same formula.** 
* 11 1 P• 1 ~*)4,- P• )01 
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b. General Motors Corporation, Chrysler Corporation, 
and American Motors Corporation settlements cover union-
ized office workers, as well as hourly-rated employeesg 
The Ford agreement covers hourly-rated employees only.* 
c. The plan covering employees of The Packard 
Division of the Studebaker - Packard Corporation differs 
only in the amount of benefits payable. when the trust 
fund falls below thirteen percent of its maximum level.** 
d. The American Motors agreement is identical to 
the Ford plan with the important exception that the 
company contributions to the trust fund were not to be 
made until September 15, 1956;*** a fifteen and one-hal£ 
month deferment in comparison to the Ford plano This 
preferential treatment appears to be the result of the 
comparatively poor .financial condition or the smaller 
automobile companies. 
* ;. P• 17 
** 29 P• 79 
*** lA, P• 423 
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V. ) FUTURE OF SUPPLEMENTAL UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS PLANS 
IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
A. Present Administrative Problems 
There is a strong hesitancy on the part of the 
automobile companies• representatives to divulge infor-
mation pertinent to working problems of the plan. The 
t'epresentatives fear that what they reveal may be publi-
cized and used against their company in future union 
negotiations.* 
l. Contract complexity 
Ford legal and ~conomie specialists and union 
representatives composed the text of the supplemental 
unemployment benefits plan with intent to leave as 
little room as possible !or interpretation and argument 
and to avoid the necessity of laJ"ge administrative 
staffs. In so doing, they tried to anticipate every 
question and specifically answer it in the supplemental 
agreement. The result was contractual complexity; the 
very thing that the specialists attempted to avoid.** 
Four lawyers were employed to interpret the agreement 
for a General Motors assembly plant in Massachusetts. 
The complexity or the system by which credit units are 
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compiled and sacrificed account for the majority of 
questions from puzzled employees.* 
2. La~k of· serious problems 
In spite of. the contract complexity, Mr. William Q. 
McGagh, manager of the Supplemental Unemployment Benefits 
Department at Chrysler Corporation, has reported that 
administration.of the plan "seems to be going reasonably 
well" and that problems "have not been serious"• An 
example of one of various minor problems was the fact 
that the Trustee could not use a check for making the 
benefit payments in states outside the state in which he 
was located without danger of being deemed to be "doing 
business" in the other states, which has various legal 
and tax aspects adverse to the Trustee.c A draft system 
was finally devised which freed the Trustee of any 
possible implications of doing business in other states•** 
). Dissatisfaction of high seniority employees 
Some high seniority employees are justifiably con•. 
earned over the fact that five cents of the hourly wage 
increase negotiated by their union is going into a pool 
which will benefit only low seniority employees, except 
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in the event of a mass layoff. The apparent way to 
allay the fear or the high seniority workers is to revise 
the agreement to permit individual employee accounts 
to which the five cents_per worked hour would be credited, 
as in the glass industry plan (discussed in detail in 
chapter VII). This does not seem likely,·however, for 
the United Auto Workers Union has indicated opposittit>nn. 
to such plans on the grounds that the plans do not lmpart 
suf.ficient incentive to influence the employer to stabil-
ize employment.* 
4. Eligibility problem 
In order to receive a supplemental unemployment 
benefits check, the employee must prove his state unemploy-
ment compensation eligibility by presentation of his check 
from the state. Frequently the employee cashes the state 
check before presenting it as verificat.ion of state eligi· 
bility. Or, the employee may be eligible for state pay-
ment in all respects but has overdrawn his state account. 
In such an instance the employee is eligible for supple-
mental unemployment benefits but still has not a state 
check to present as proof of eligibilityo All such cases 
must be re-checked with the state unemployment compensation 
* .32 1 P• 415 
office and result in additional administrative expenses 
and a substantial time delay before the employee finally 
receives his supplemental unemployment benefits check.* 
s. "One-stop" procedure 
Another problem concerned the desire of the union 
negotiators to establish an administrative procedure 
which would allow the employee to obtain both his supple-
mental unemployment'.benef'its check and state unemployment 
compensation check at the state office at the same time. 
No company has adopted this procedure and the Federal 
Unemployment Compensation Bureau has indicated that it 
would not be proper for the state agencies to take on 
the additional responsibility of making the company 
supplemental unemploy~ent benefits checks available.** 
B. Legal Problems 
There were three legal stipulations that had to be· 
ruled upon favorably for 'the agreement to remain et.f'ective • 
... 
1. States in which at least two-thirds of' Ford 
Company employees resided had to permit integrated pay-
mentsplulc* i.e., payments of both,~supplemental unemployment 
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-benefits from the employer and state unemployment compen-· 
sation. The success of the supplemental plans hinged 
upon this problem more than· any other. Most ·of the . 
states included in their Unemployment Compensation laws 
a clause that disqualified a person from receiving 
be:p.ef'its if that person had received any renumeration 
from an employer during the period for which state 
compensation was being sought • · ·The stipulations w.ere 
designed to prevent an employee from collecting state 
·benefits while also receiving payments .for w-ork rendered 
to an employer ••••• wP.ieh. obviously would have constituted 
a misuse of state .funds. The United Auto Workers' rep-
resentatives* were confident that the problem of the 
legality of the integrated state and employer payments 
could be efi'ectively overcome through the application 
of union influence and pressure on the state legislature& 
The union confidence was justified, for in May 1956 
fourteen states with mo~e than two-thirds of the auto-
mobile industry's total employment bad sanctioned the 
dual payments• and in December 1956 twenty-five ~tates 
had agreed to allow integrated payments. Georgia and 
Maryland passed legislation permitting dual pa.ymentst 
other states merely stretched the interpretation of 
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existing laws to permit supplementation. Virginia, 
Indiana, and Ohio have barred dual payments from their 
states.* Those states not permitting integrated payments 
may be jeopordizing the chances of attracting new plants 
of the automobile industry and other industries in which 
supplemental unemployment benefits plans have been ne-
totiated or may be negotiated in the future. The drafters 
of the plan devised a system, however, for supplementing 
the state unemployment compensation of laid-off workers 
even in those states not pennitting integration. After 
June 1, 1957 1 the employee may draw state payments for 
either three or four weeks and receive company supplemen-
tation for the sum of the previous three or four w~eks.** 
The employee _is not eligible for state unemployment comp-
. ensation on the week that he receives his retroactive 
company payments. Management associations have been active 
in attempting to block supplemental unemployment benefits 
plans through legislation.. $400 • 000 was raised to prevent 
the passage of a bill that would permit Ohio to allow 
supplementatfon; the bill was not passed.*** In March of 
1956 Michigan and New York legislatures both refUsed to 
pass bills which would have limited supplementary benefits 
* 25, Po 90 
** 3, P• 149 
*** 19, P• ;o 
46 
1 ' 
to no more than t\'lo ... thirds of take-nome pay when combined 
with state unemployment, compensation. Opnonents of the 
bills argued that supplemental unemployment,; benefits were 
collectiile bargaining matters, not legislative matters.* 
2. Company contributions to the fund had to be 
recognized as deductible expenses for federal income 
tax purposes.** This hurdle has been cleared by a recent 
treasury department decision to·. the effect that payments 
to the trust .funds are considered currently deductible 
expenses for federal income taxpurposes.-*** 
)~ The· cQmpany had to be permitted to exclude the 
trust .fun~ contributions when computing wages for purposes 
of overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.**** 
The administrator of the.Depa.rtment of Labor Wage and 
Hour and Public Contracts Divisions ruled on September 71 
1955 that the trust fund contributions need not be included 
in the computation of wages for overtime purposes.***** 
c •. Future Union Plans 
1. Union declaration of plans 
·Mr. t>Jalter Reuther, president of the United Auto 
Workers, made the following statement in reference to his 
future strategy regarding supplemental unemployment 
* Jl, P• 699 
** ), p. 146 
*~)* 30 1 P• 29 ~a'.«** 31 P• 146 
***** 27, 
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benefits plans: 
"Youtll see what we can do in a like six ... year 
period in raising the benefits, now that we have the 
principle of the guar;;anteed annual wage. In 19.58, there 
will be millions and millions in the Ford trust fund and 
then it will be relatively easy to apply for improved 
bene.fits.,"* 
In reference to supplemental unemployment benefits 
plans, f.llr. George Meany, president of the ·A, F. of L. · -
C.I.a., has predicted that "this prinicple will hit 
practically every collective bargaining table in the 
next couple of years.n** 
The above quotes clearly indi catet' the int~nded 
path of union activity in regard to future guaranteed 
wage negotiations and dramatize the propriety of the 
term "guaranteed entering wedger.*** which has been 
applied to the agreements.. Table II compares the union's 
goal with the existing automobile industry's plan. 
2. Experience with·pension funds 
Experience \'lith pension funds affords an example 
of how unionsfight hard to establish principles and then 
* 2, P• 2 
** 11, P• 2 
*** 23, p .. 75 
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COMPARISON OF PRESENT AUTO INDUSTRY s~u.B. PLAN AND 
. . 
How plan 1a 
financed. 
Weekly 
benefits 
Maximum. 
benefit 
duration 
Employee 
eligibility 
requirements 
How layoff 
credits accumu-
late 
How layoff 
credit$ dwindle. 
State SUB-UC 
integration 
THE U.A.W, GOAL 
. AUTO ptfN OAW GOAL 
Companies pay S¢ per 
employee ho~ worked 
into · SOB fund. 
65% of take~home pay 
for first four weeks, 
then 6o1b. . Weekly SUB 
maximum: $2;. 
26 weeks. 
One year's 
seniority. 
Until June 19S7, low 
seniority workers earn 
credits slower. Then; 
all get i credit for 
each week worked. 
Credits go faster for 
benefits .·as ·:'futld· .. 'level 
falls; low seniority 
workers surrender 
credits taste~; too. 
Companies pay into a 
trust tund, size tied 
to peak employment level. 
Fund should be re-insured. 
100% of take-home pay. 
No maximum. 
52 weeks for seniority 
workers, less ror non-
seniority workers. 
Two year's seniority for 
52 weeks of benefits; 
shorter duration on a grad-
uated basis for workers 
with less service. All 
guaranteed 40 hours a week. 
Seniority workers earn 
one credit for every two 
weeks worked; nonseniority 
workers earn lese. 
Low seniority workers 
surrender credits taster 
for benefits. 
Plan goes into effect Plan to go into effect in 
only .when st.ates in ~-;; .. ~.c::~any state approving SUB-
which 2/'J ot eo.'s UC integration. 
employees work approve 
integration. 
When employees During layoff. 
draw benefits. 
All employees get benefits 
for less-than-40~our~ 
weeks; seniority workers 
get benefits for full-
week layoff's. 
* 16, PP• SS-S6 
build upon the principles in future negotiations. When 
first negotiated, less than six years ago, the pension 
plans provided a maximum ceiling o£ $100 per 1nonth for 
retired workers. Now maximum pensions are $252.50 for 
a worker with forty years of service (automobile industry) 
whose wife is over sixty-five years of age.* Should 
future supplemental unemployment benefits negotiations 
be as successful as pension negotiations, it will not 
be long before Mr. Reuther's aim of 100% benefits is 
realized. 
). Possibility of' shorter work-week precedence 
The only item on the union agenda which threatens 
to take priority over guaranteed wages is the shorter 
work-week. Many Ford employees wanted Mr. Reuther to 
nego~iate for a thirty or thirty-five hour week in lieu 
of~anteed wages.** They argued that a reduced work-
week would spread out the available \vork and assure jobs,. 
(The argument was fallacious, for it would reduce the 
effectiveness of one of management's tools ••• that of cutting 
b.sck production without reducing the workforce; i.e., the 
opportunity to reduce hours of work.). However, even though 
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the union.should concentrate on a drive for the shorter 
work-week, it is reasonable to assume that a stronger 
supplemental unemployment bene£its plan will be negotiated 
at the same time. 
D. Conclusions 
There seems to be nothing in sight to thwart the 
union's plan to increase the size and duration of supple-
mental unemployment benefits in the .future. Various 
administrative problems have appeared, but they have been 
minor in nature. All of the legal problema that threat-
ened the life of the supplemental unemployment benefits 
agreement ·havedoeen: .. efta.cttv~ly:: hurdled 11 There appears 
to be no reason why all of the automobile companies 
should not have a satisf'acto:ry administrative experience 
with the plan and be willing to grudgingly concede to the 
union's demands of increased benefits £or a longer duration 
in 1958. 
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VI. EFFECT OF SUPPLEMENTAL UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS PLANS 
ON THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
A. Effect on Sales 
1. Price policy 
The ultimate goal of the ~nion in respect to 
guaranteed wages is to influence the employer (through 
the use of a negative monetary incentive) to stabilize 
employment by reducing sales fluctuations which in 
turn would allow a stabilized production schedule and 
employment. Union representatives have advised the 
automobile industry to "cut your prices when the market 
turns sour"* as a means of reducing excessive sales 
fluctuations. The thoughtfulness of such a statement 
is questioned, for that is prec~sely what automobile 
dealers have done ever since the supply of automobiles 
caught up with the suppressed demand for new cars in 
1950. Each year the sales pattern is approximately the 
same tor the industry, barring of course, certain out-
side factors such as general depression, wartime controls, 
and raw material shortages. Spring is usually a period 
of heavy demand as consumers get ready to enjoy summertime 
travel in the new ear they have promised themselves all 
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winter long. Summer brings an average demand which slacks 
ott as fall approaches. At this point the automobile deal-
er offers fabulous prices for traded-in cars, which, in 
effec~ reduces the price of the new car, in order to attract 
purchasers. Another method used to combat the annual de-
mand reduction in the fall months is the introduction of 
new models in October and Novembero It seems then, : .. that 
the industry is doing all it can to alleviate the radical 
fluctuations in its sales picture; the union's suggestion 
that prices be cut "when the market turns sour" appears to 
be without merit. 
2. Sales trends 
The sales trends of the automobile industry, as in-
dicated on chart I, are highly dependent on the amount 
of disposable income in the economy, the saturation of 
the market, and the general feeling of business optimism 
or pessimism, whichever it may be, of the consuming public. 
The sales drop depicted on chart I in 1952 resulted from 
wartime {Korean) s~ortages; the one and one-half million 
car sales drop in 1956 resulted from a·saturated market 
after a record 1955 sales year. The economic (disposable 
income) and psychological (consumer 9 s attitudes - summer-
time travel) forces underlying the seasonal demand for 
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automobiles are traditional and strong; it is doubted if 
they can be substantially changed by reasonable price 
policies. 
B. Effect on Production 
· 1. Stabilization 
As indicated on chart II, passenger car production 
fluctuations are necessitated by the previously discussed 
sales fluctuations. The method of stabilizing production 
by producing for inventory is not applicable here due to 
the secrecy of model changes. Since peak demand for cars 
occurs in the first half o£ the year, the industry would 
have to produce the coming year's models during the late 
summer months in order to follow a "produce for stock" 
solution to production stabilization. This would allow 
rival manufacturers an opportunity to study the design 
of the inventoried cars and possiblo/ incorporate the 
better features of the style into their own product. 
Also.· product cost (inventory cost would be prohibitive) 
and size (neither manufacturer or dealer would relish 
the thought of providing storage space £or thousands 
of cars) ostensibly prohibit producing for inventory. 
Other methods of employment stabilization (quick model 
;; 
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changeover, use of overtime, and maintenance work 
during slack periods} are currently being used. In 
view of the above, it is felt that the supplemental 
unemployment benefits plan will not substantially 
effect production stabilization because the limited 
liability of the plan is not sufficient to force the 
.. 
manufacturers t.o produce for stock. Production schedul-
ing has always been a keenly watched and specialized 
function in the automobile industry; it is difficult to 
imagine great strides being made in that field due to 
the supplemental unemployment benefits plans. 
2. Automation 
The guaranteed annual wage, if realized in future 
negotiations, will have the effect of fostering the 
use of machinery in lieu of labor. A given company's 
labor force level will become less flexible and will 
be considered a fixed cost, thereby reducing an advantage 
of labor over machinery and tending to influence manage-
ment's decision toward use of more machinery in lieu of 
additional labor. This will be particularly true in 
periods of expansion when laborers need not be laid-of£ 
when new ·machinery is introduced# It is felt, however, 
that the limited liability of the supplemental unemployment 
benefits program does not carry sufficient monetary 
incentive for the a~ployer to change his automation 
decisions appreciably. 
). Productivity 
Output per worker should not be adversely affected 
by the program for two reasons. First. "featherbedding" 
(the practice of purposely performing at a pace slower 
than normal) should be reduced due to the added employ-
ment security that the supplemental unemployment benefits 
program extends to the employee. Second, the plan allows 
the company to shift employees to work other than their 
regular work in the same plant or labor market area 
(with the exception of certain skilled workers).* This 
stipulation of labor mobility, i£ intelligently utilized, 
should tend to increase worker productivity to an appreci-
able extent. 
4. Subcontracting 
The supplemental unemployment benefits program will 
not cause extensive changes in decisions to make or buy. 
component parts by the manufacturers. The long run, or 
permanent, decisions to subcontract or not will 
* 2, P• 12 
be ·influenced only .to the extent that labor costs in• 
volved in manufacturing in the home plant will be in-
creased by the five cent per hour plan cost. Thus, 
--
the supplemental program should tend to increase the 
volume of subcontracted work due to the increased cost 
ot manufacturing the part in ~he home plant. Short run, 
or temporary, decisions should remain unchanged in 
respect to subcontracting for the following reasons. 
First, the cost of buying and maintaining equipment to 
produce a previously purchased item would be consider-
able, Second, the cost of training workers and manage~ 
ment to handle the additional products would be appreci-
able. Third, the company~ prime reason for preferring 
to originally subcontract for the manufacture of the 
product may have been due to the unpredictability of the 
length of time that the item would be needed and thus 
hesitated to purchase necessary specialized or semi-
automatic machinery necessary to the manufacture of 
the item. Fourth, and last, the automobile companies 
realize the importance of good relations with their sub-
contracters and would hesitate to give and rescind 
contract orders whenever it seemed de$irable, for that 
practice would eventually lead to higher. prices from the 
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subcontracters necessitated by the unpredictability of 
their own business .. * 
;. Personnel·· practices 
The supplemental benefits program l'Zill tend to reduce 
productive labor turnover (although the extent of the 
reduction is highly debatable) and put more emphasis on 
selection procedures,~noog, and morale building. Since 
the workforce will be more stable, a smaller percentage 
of the money allocated to the above personnel .functions 
will be wasted on the "driftersn and victims of normal 
turnover• 
c. Effect on Finance 
1. Efficient vs. inefficient companies 
The supplemental unemployrpent benefits plans should 
tend to financially aid the most efficient companies and 
adversely affect the less efficient firms, for lower 
turnover (and therefore lower supplemental unemployment 
bene.fits cost) is characteristic of the more ef.fioient 
2. The "Big Three" 
The "big three" autQmobile companies' (Ford Qg~~~·,'.­
Q~~~ra~.:;,.MQ¥.qrs:::;(;Qrp~, c~p~;J;.~~ t~ft.ry~ler Corp.) supple ... 
* ?, 'P• 19 . 
** 14, P• 64 
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mental unemployment benef'it,s·trust funds are standing 
up surprisingly well under the drains o£ the benefits 
paid out, as indicated in table III, below. 
TABLE III* 
trust ~~d Positions 
Benefits Trust Fund Position 
Paid (Nov. 1956) 
Ford .............. $ 752,8..30 ................ 31.,6~ 
Chrysler •••••••• 1~900,ooo .... - ••••• o •• 24.7:6 
QeneralMotors •• 1.200,000 •••••••••••• .36.4.~ 
Maximum trust f'und position is that amount which would 
allow approximately 60% o£ all the hourly paid employees 
to be paid the maXimum benefits or twen'tty-five dollars 
per week for twenty-six weeks.~uf; Thus1 in way of inter-
pretation of' the above table, although General Motors 
Corporation paid out over one miliion dollars between 
June and November, the level of its trust tund in Novem-
ber was high enough to permit the company ~o lay ot£ 
* 16, p., S9 
1(-:(c 6 
--
almost 22% ( .6 times )6.4~) of its workforce without 
depleting the fund. It appears, therefore, that the 
t~ust fUnds are set up on a sound financial basis that 
can well withstand the pressures of the normal supplemen-
tal benefits drains. 
). Effect on small companies 
Newly formed American Motors (Hudson - Nash) and 
the Studebaker - Packard Corporation are the two signif-
icant marginal firms of the automobile industry. Since 
they are marginal, their employment fuluctuates more 
than does the employment . of the big three .firms. American 
Motors president George Romney felt that the United Auto 
Workers would go easy on American Motors because or its 
marginal condition, but United Auto Workers' v1oe presi-
dent Leonard.Woodeock said that American Motors employees 
need a guaranteed annual wage even more than employees 
of the big three manufacturers because of its more violent-
ly fluctuating employment record.* However. in recogni-
tion of the dangerous marginal condition of American 
Motors, the union allowed that company's payments to the 
trust fund to be deferred until September 15, 1956••, . 
which gave the company a fifteen and one-half month 
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deferral in comparison with the big three. This un-
doubtedly was in recognition of the smaller 'company's 
inability to pay {American Motors was only recently 
saved from financial death by funds from the Curtiss-
\'lright Corporation} and indicates the United Auto Workers' 
willingness to make concessions in order not to fatally 
injure the smaller companies. 
4. Methods of reducing the financial impact 
Union representatives have made the following cost 
reducing recommendations:* 
a. Stabilize employment - a lower labor turnover 
would result in a reduced supplemental unemployment 
benefits cost. 
b. Lobby for higher unemployment compensation 
benefits from the individual states - this would effective-
ly reduce the supplemental unemployment benefits cost, 
since the amount of the benefit paid by the company dimin-
ishes as the state unemployment compensation check in-
creases. 
. ' 
c. Establish a re-insurance system - establish 
a pool into which all automobile manufacturers would 
* 8 
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contribute; i.e • .,. one big trust fund. This fund \iould 
reduce the total amount of money needed to be set 
aside tor trust fund purposes. However, i't is doubted 
if tt}e present C'OJPpetitive nature of t.pe automobile 
industry wotud allow such financial collusion to take 
place. 
d. Support national policies designed 
to maintain full employ,ment - i.e9 1 lobby for legisla-
tive economic policies which are aimed at combatting . 
unemployment. 
In general, it appears that the safest 
way of reducing the. supplemental unemployment benefits 
bill would be to stabilize employment as tar as possi-
ble. The very nature of the industry, though, will not 
pennit full stabilization of employment.# It is likely 
that the industry will do everything possible to prevent 
radical flue~uationa in its employment picture, for, as 
previously noted, management o£ ~he corporations is 
pledged to use every means possible to increase returns 
to stockholders and to enhanee the value of the stock9 
The other methods of reducing the unemployment benefits· 
bill suggested by the union concern lesislation which the 
1J see P•· 56 
union has been attempting to have passed for years. 
Now it appears that the union is trying to force 
management to tak~ up its legislative battles~ 
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VII. EFFECT OF THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY SUPPLEMENTAL 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS PLANS ON THE ECONOM!f 
A. Indirect Effect ofthe Automobile 
Industry on the Economy 
1. Positive cyclical·.correlation 
The automobile industry is such a large and vital 
segment of our econom~ that it has become known as a 
barometer o£ industry in.general. The .folly of generaliz-
ation is recognized;· it is entirely possible that the 
automobile industry could experience a poor sales year 
while the rest o.f the economy prospered.. However, this 
has not usually been the case. The period following 
World War II was prosperous for both the automobile in-
dustry and the economy, a.lthot1gh probably due to suppressed 
consumer demand and easy money more than anything else. 
In 1953, though, automobile production finally caught up 
with the suppressed demand and excessive inventories 
were accumulated. The inventories ana their effect on 
businessments attitudes may have easily been a.n important . 
.factor in triggering the recession of mid 1953. In 1955 
both the automobile industry and the economy _in general 
had a banner year, both leveling off in 1956. 
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2. Complimentary products and employment 
The automobile industry Slone employs. over one and 
one-half million workers.* Millions more. are employed 
by various firms that supply the industry with raw 
materials (steel, rubber, plastics• copper) and by 
industries which supply goods-and services necessary 
to keep the finished product in use, such as the road 
building industry, maintenance garages, service stations, 
..... . 
and the oil industry. All o£ the foregoing industries 
and their employees are adversely affected by poor condi-
tions in the automobile industry. It is not unreasonable 
to assume then, that the positive correlation between 
cycles of the general economy and automobile production 
(discussed above) may be partially due to the influence 
of the automobile industry on other vital segments of 
the economy. It !'ollows,. then, that the supplemental 
unemployment benefits plan negotiated in the automobile 
industry will effect the ecomony in two ways: (1) through 
the indirect effect of the automobile industry on the 
economy and (2) by setting an example for other industries 
to follow through inter .... industry patternbargaining. 
* 11, P• 1 
B. Inter-industry Pattern Negotiation Influence 
of the Automobile Industry 
The United Auto Workers have jurisdiction over 
the automobile industry, the aircraft industry, and the 
agricultural implement industryo It is not surprising 
that unemployment benefits programs spread quickly to 
all industries under t.he United Auto Workers' jurisdic-
tion, but the plana did not stop at that unionts bound-
aries. In· spite of heavy opposition from management 
associations, the plans spread quickly to the can compani~ 
and to the aluminum, steel, rubber, glass, electrical, 
and maritime industries. Agreements in those industries 
were basically similar to the automobile industry plans, 
with the sole exception ot the glass contracts. 
1. Reason for rapid spread of the plans 
The prime purpose of an individual concern is to 
make as large a profit as possible. Businessmen have 
made eloquent speeches concerning the adverse economic 
and social effects of guaranteed wages in an attempt to 
stall the union drive for the wage plans. It is believed 
that most businessmen,.though, were concerned more about 
the effect of guaranteed wages on their own profit picture 
-~- -
than about the resultant economic or social effects. 
This is not to criticize management in general; for the 
managers are obligated to the owners of factors of pro-
duction (stockholders) to be profit conscious. It is 
reasonable to believe, then, that whenthe automobile 
industry plan was re~e~led as containing limited liabil-
ity and predictable costs, one of the larges barriers to 
guaranteed wage negotiations was crushed,_ i.e., business-
men were no longer .fear£ul of exorbitant coats and shrunken 
profits, The :feature of limited liability and predictable 
costs now made it possible for management to determine the · 
effect .of the plan on their own pro.fit. Thus the managers 
were more susceptible to guara~teed wage plan proposals 
in general and to the automobile industry supplemental 
unemployment benefits plan in particular. 
2. Comparison of Automobile and Other 
Industry Unemployment Benefits Plans 
a. Table IV compares the supplemental plan of the 
automobile industry with the plan negotiated between the • 
can companies and the United Steelworkers of America. 
Past practice in the c_an industry had 'been for the United 
Steelworkers of America to negotiate contracts with the 
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TABLE IV* 
COMPARISON OF PRESENT AUTO INDUSTRY S.U.B. PLAN AND 
THE CAN INDUSTRY S.U.B. PLAN 
How plan is 
tina need 
W$ekly 
benefits 
· Companies pay 5¢ per 
employee hour worked 
into SUB fund. 
65% ot take-home pay 
for first £our weeks 
then 60~. Weekly siJ! 
maximum t $25 ... 
Maximum benefit 26 weeks 
duration 
Employee 
eligibility 
requirements 
How layoff 
credits 
accumulate. 
How layoff 
credits 
dwindle. 
State SUB-UO 
integration 
When employees 
draw benefits • 
. * 16, P• 5S 
One year's 
$eniority~ 
Until June 1957, low 
seniority workers earn 
credits slower. Then, 
all get 1/2 credit tor 
each week worked. 
Credits go faster for 
benefits as fund level 
falls J low seniority 
workers surrender 
credits taster; too. 
Plan goes into effect 
only when states in 
which 2/3 ot co.ts 
employees work approve 
integration. 
During layoff .. 
.... cAR PflN ·· ... 
Same 
65% ot take-home pay (max.: t2;.) plus $2. 
each £or up to 4 dependents 
until UC e.;pires; then 
max. of $46.80 plus up to $8. tor dependents. 
52 weeks 
Three year's 
seniority. 
Eligible employees get 
one credit for every 
SO hours worked after 
Sept. , 1954. 
Credl:ts:!_go.it~ster for 
benefits as fund level 
falls, amount o£ benefit 
drops, too. Low seniority 
workers surrender credits 
taster. 
Plan goes into effect 
in any state approving 
integration. 
Same 
steel industry before opening negotiations with the can 
companies.; The can companies usually agreed t.o terms 
similar to those adopted-in the steel industry,: i.e., 
inter-industry pattern bargaining was followed. However, 
in June of 1955 David J. McDonald, president of the United 
Steelworkers Union, notified the management of the two 
major can companies (American and Continental} that the 
union would seek an annual wage when the two contracts ·:-: 
became open for negotiation on August 1, 1955. The manage-
ment of Continental Can made "exhaustive" studies of 
previous unemployment in the company, and, after several 
weeks of negotiations, -a supplemental unemployment benefits 
agreement was reached on August 1.3, 1955 to become eftec• 
tive October lt 1955 with respect to fund payments and 
effective October:l• 1956 with respect to benefit payments. 
The plan covers·l4,000 employees; a similar plan has been 
offered by the company to unorganized employees and to 
other unions in the company.* Major differences between 
the can company and the automobile plan includes: 
{l) Three years continuous seniority are required 
for eligibility as opposed to a one year seniority 
requirement under the automobile industry plan. The three 
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year seniority requirement is intended to disqualify 
seasonal help fromthe plan in the can industry. 
(2) MaXimum duration of fifty-two weeks; the auto• 
mobile industry plan has a mAximum duration of·twenty-
six weeks. 
b. Steel and aluminum industry 
Table V compares the automobile industry plan with 
the plan negotiated in the steel and aluminum ind1.:stry 
in August, 1956. The most significant departures from 
the automo~ile industry plan include: 
(l) A three cent contribution per man hour compen-
sated as opposed to a. five cent contribution to the trust 
fund under the automobile plan. 
(2) Maximum duration of benefit payments is fifty-
two weeks; the automobile plan has a maximum duration of 
twenty-six weeks. 
{3) Two years' continuous service are required for 
eligibility; the automobile industry plan requires only 
one year's seniority. 
e. Rubber industry 
Table VI compares the automobile industry supplemental 
unemployment bene!its plan with the plan of the rub~er 
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TABLE ·v* 
COMPARISON OF PRESENT AUTO INDUSTRY S.U.B. PLAN AND 
THE STEEL PLAN 
How plan is 
financed 
Weekly benefits 
Maximum benefit 
duration 
Employee 
eligibility 
requirements 
How layoff 
credits 
accumulate 
HOirl layoff 
credits 
dwindle 
State SUB-UC 
integration 
·when employees 
draw benefits.· 
* 16. PP• 55•56 
AUTO PLAN 
Companies pay 5¢ per 
employee hour worked 
into SUS fundo 
65~ of take•home pay 
for first four weeks, 
then 6()%. Weekly SUB 
maximum; $2 5. 
26 weeks 
One year's 
seniority. 
U~til June 1957, low 
seniority workers earn 
credits slower. Then, 
all get l/2 credit for 
each ?reek worke.d. 
Credits go fast.er for 
benefits as fund· level 
falls; low seniority 
workers surrender 
credits faster, too. 
Plan goes into e.f£ect 
· only when states in 
which 2/) of co.'s 
employees Tt(ork approve 
integration. 
During layo,f£. 
STEEL. PLAN 
Companies pay 3¢ per 
employee hour worked 
'into SUB fund; incur 2¢ 
"contingent liability4tt 
65% of take-home pay (maximum: $25) plus $2 
each for up to tour 
dependents until UC 
expires; then, maximum 
ot $42.50 plus up to $6 
for dependents. 
52 weeks 
Two year's continuous 
service. 
Eligible employees get 
l/2 credit tor each 
week worked after Aug. 1, 
1955. 
Credits go faster tor 
benefits as fund level 
.falls; amount of benefits 
drops, too. Low seniority 
workers surrender oredits 
taster. 
Plan goes into e££ect 
in any state approving 
integration. 
During any week with 
less than 32 hours 
worked.. 
----- -· ·-- -----
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TABLE VI* 
COMPARISON OF PRESENT AUTO INDUSTRY S.U.B. PLAN AND 
THE RUBBER PLAN 
How plan is 
£1naneed 
Weekly 
benefits 
. AUTO PLAN . 
Companies pay 5¢ per 
employee hour worked 
into SUB fund. 
6S% of take•home pay 
for first four week~ 
then 6~. Weekly SUB 
maXimum: $25. 
Maximum benefit 26 weeks · 
duration 
Employee eligi- One yearts 
bility require" seniority. 
menta 
How layoff 
credits 
accumulate 
How layoff 
credits 
dwindl.e 
State SUB-UC 
integration 
When employees 
draw benefits 
* 16, PP• S5-S6 
Until June 1957, low 
senio~ity workers earn 
credits slower. Then, 
all get 1/2 credit :tor 
each week worked. 
Credits go faster for 
benefits as fUnd level 
falls; low seniority 
workers surrender 
credits faster, too. 
Plan goes into effect 
only when states in 
which 2/3 of co.'s 
employees work approve 
integration. 
DUl'"ing layoff .. 
RUBBER. PLAN 
Companies pay )¢ per 
employee hour worked 
into SUB fund, 
65% of take-home pay (maximum SUB; $25), plus $2 each for up to four 
dependents until UO 
expires; then, maximum ot $48.)0 plus up to $8 for 
dependents. In Ohio and 
other states barring SUB 
payments! ben$fits will be 
paid iri ump sum after VC 
expires. 
Same 
Same 
.Eligible employees get 
1/2 credit !or each full 
week· worked after July 
16, 1956. 
Credits go faster tor 
benefita as fund level 
falls; amount of benetit 
drops, too. Low seniority 
workers aurrender credits 
faster. 
Plan goes into effect 
in any state approving 
integration. 
During layott and in axcy-
week in which regular g_ 
hour employees work less 
than 20 hours or regular 
9 hour employees work less 
than 18 hours. · 
' I 
industry. The only fundamental di.f.ference between the 
two plans is constituted by the three cent contribution 
per man hour worked to the trust fund, as opposed to 
the automobile industry .five cent contribution. 
d.. Glass industry 
Table VII compares the glass industry wage guarantee 
with the supplemental unemployment benefits program of' 
the automobile industry. This plan represents an entirely 
new type of supplemental benefit. The~National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers, although staunchly against the 
. . 
automobile industry supplemental plan, endorsed the plan 
adopted in the glass industry in November 1955·* Both 
plans use a ssytem of trust fund contributions and both 
plans supplement a laid of£ employee's state compensation; 
similarities. ho-vrever, end there. Under the glass plan, 
the companies involved contribute ten cents per man hour 
worked into an individual trust fund fpr each employee. 
After $600 is accumulated in the individual accounts, 
five cents per man hour worked is credited to a fund for 
each employee that can be withdrawn at vacation time. 
Lay-off benefits from the fund vary from fifteen dollars 
to th:a:.rty dollars per week and have a duration of twenty 
* 29, P• 81 
I 
~-~------------. 
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TABLE VII* 
COMPARISON OF PRESENT AUTO INDUSTRY S.U.B. PLAN AND 
THE GLASS PLAN 
How plan is 
financed. 
WeeklY. 
benefits. 
Maximum 
benefit 
duration 
Employee 
eligibility 
requirements 
State SUB-UC 
integration 
When employees 
draw benefits. 
* 16, PP• 55 ... 56 
AUTO ·PLAN 
Companies pay 5¢ per 
employee hour worked 
into SUB fund. 
65% of take-home pay 
for i'irst four weeks, 
then 60%. Weekly SUB 
maximum: $2$. 
. 26 weeke 
One year's 
seniority. 
. 1 
Plan goes into effect 
only when states in · 
which 2/) of co.'s 
employees work approve 
integration. · 
During layoff. 
, GLASS PLAN 
Companies pay 10¢ per 
employee hour worked 
into vested individual 
accounts up to $600; 
then contributions go 
into employee's vacation 
fund. 
Employee can withdraw 
from his account not 
less than $15 or more 
than 10% of his balance (maximum: $30. weekly) 
40 weeks, $15 per week 
until $600 is gone. 
All regular employees 
covered. 
No provision in contract; 
not a problem in most 
states. 
During layoff or illness 
and upon quitting or 
. retiring. At death., 
money in account goes 
to beneficiaries. 
' -
to forty weeks, both-size and duration of benefits being 
dependent on seniority. Also, the employee may draw upon 
his account in time of illness, death,· or separation from 
the company in addition to. using· the account to supplement 
unemployment compensation.* This plan has the advantage 
of benefiting the high seniority,employees who are not 
likely to be laid of£; a key problem in the administration 
of the automobile industry plan. Also the glass plan 
encounters no legal entanglements in r~spect to integra-
tion of state and company payments.**· 
Eh ·. Other industries 
Other industries which agreed to plans similar to 
the automobile industry supplemental unemployment benefits 
plan include the electrical,aviation, maritime, and farm 
equipment industries. Detailed explanations of the above 
plans would be supernuous; they are mentioned to indicate 
the breadth of activity to whieh the plans have spread. 
The glass industry negotiated the only plan which radically 
differs from the original Ford supplemental unemployment 
benefits plan. All other plans have many features that 
are found in the plan or the automobile industry, which 
leads to the conclusion that extensive pattern bargaining 
* .32, P• 415 
** .34, P• 300 
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has taken place in the past in respect to the supplemental 
unemployment benefits plans and will also take place in 
the future. These common features inciude; (1) provisions 
to prevent low seniority employees from exhausting funds 
before high seniority employees are laid off, (2) maximum 
liability and prediotabl e costs,· ( .3 ) a maximum trust .fund 
limit, (4) either payments or duration of payments scaled 
down a.s level of trust .fund falls, ( 5) .administration is 
made the responsibility of management, and f6) the feature 
of integration of company payments with state unemployment 
compensation. 
The most notable of the differing features included 
the amount of company contribution to the trust fund 1 
duration of payments, and eligibility requirements. The 
trend thus far appears to-be toward a duration of payments 
longer than twenty ... six weeks and toward eligibility require-
ments more stringent than one years' seniority. Although 
there are many variations in the rate of the company trust 
fund contribution, there seems to be no discernable trend. 
' 
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VIII. EFFECT OF SUPPLEMENTAL UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ON 
THE ECONOMY 
A. Future Growth of Supplemental Unemployment 
Benefits Plana 
1. Factors aiding growth 
The impact of the benefit plans on the economy will 
be dependent on the swiftness with which the plans spread. 
Approximately two million workers* are now covered by the 
plans which are only a year and a half old. It is reason-
able to believe that those unions expressing no current 
interest in the plans are patiently waiting for the supple-
mental unemployment pioneer industries to iron out the 
inevitable problems. When the plans have been if effect 
a few years, it will be a relatively simple matter for 
the unions to improve upon existing plans and offer them 
to management at future negotiations. In that way, the 
experiences of the pioneer industries, both good and bad, 
will be used to further the spread of the benefits programs. 
Once the plans have been successfully used and proven sound 
in a tew major industries, it is felt that the issue will 
be a topic of discussion at almost all significant 
* 16, P• 55 I 
so 
bargaining tables. 
2. Growth deterrents 
State laws which did not permit·- integration o£ 
private and state lay of£ payments were by far the 
strongest deter·rent to the growth of the plans. However, 
through interpretation of existing laws and legislation 
o£ new laws, integration of payments is becoming a minor 
problem.# Also. unemployment benefits programs may not 
spread as fast as pensions because it is not likely that 
unorganized labor will get lay off benefits from employers 
as readily as they did pensions~ These factors may slow 
the advancement of guaranteed wages to some extent, but it 
is unlikely that they will halt the union drive toward 
their goal of longer duration and higher benefit supple-
ments for more workers. 
B~~ Cyclical Effect 
Perhaps the most important single question regarding 
the plans is whether they will aggravate cyclical economic 
fluctuations or whether the plans will act as a counter-
cyclical forceo Advocates and opponents of the agreements 
argue most vehemently on this topic. A close look at the 
various ways in which the plans can. affect the cyclical 
direction of the economy will bring this controversy into 
sharper focus. 
· 1. E.ff'ect on marginal producers 
The unemployment plans will definitely result in 
added wage costs for the producer. The added wage cost 
may well be sufficient to force out of business the pro-
ducer who, prior to the additional wage cost, was already 
just barely able to meet variable costs of productiono 
Even in times of prosperity, these marginal produc·e:rs : 
are found in industries which are experiencing a period 
of temporarily or permanently declining product demand. 
In a period of recession, however, even more marginal 
producers a.re to be found, The sooner: th~y become bank-
rupt or defunct, the sooner wages and aggregate effective 
demand are reduced, which tends to aggravate a cyclical 
downturn. The picture may not be as bleak as depicted• 
though. Unions have been notoriously weak in negotiations 
with marginal .firms and with companies in "sick" industri·es. 
It is logical to assume that supplemental unemployment 
wage costs will not be as large tor marginal firms, compar .. 
ati vely, as the unemployment wage bi_lls in stronger firms 
and industries• due to the union's inability or. intelligent 
refusal to burden the weaker .firms into bankruptcy. 
Thus the marginal and less efficient firms may even be 
aided by supplemental unemployment benefits .costs in 
comparison to the stronger firms. 
2. Effect on firms in declining ,industries 
The heaviest financial impact of the plans will be 
felt by firms in declining industries and .firms which 
cannot. limit production .fluctuations.* An industry which 
was .financially healthy during supplemental unemployment 
benefits negotiations and subsequently experienced a 
sizable reduction in product demand would obviously be 
hurt by the benefits payments. Also, industries such as 
the automobile industry, which, due to product demand 
fluctuations and the inadvisability ot: storing the product, 
have little control over production fluctuations and will 
feel a sharper unemployment benefits cost bite than indus-
tries more fortunate ln terms of production control factors. 
3. Reserve fund 
The :reserve fund will have a definite counter-cyclical 
ef.fect. Payments by employers will be made to the :funds 
* 14, p .. 64 
'.· .. 
constantly until the .funds reach their designated limits. 
Payments from the funds to the employees, however, will 
be highest during recession and just prior to a business 
downturn when orders to producers are cut back and the 
producers cur.ta:tl proEiuctionito con£orm to the reduction 
in orders .. Since the workers have a high propensity to 
consume, the unemployment benefits payments will find 
their way into the economic stream almost immediately 
and serve to bolster a sagging aggregate effective demand. 
Although it is agreed. that the reserve fund disbursements 
will act as a counter-cyclical power, the strength o£ 
this power may not be great. Since their are only sixteen 
million union workers in industry and the supplemental 
plans can cover'only approximately ten million of those 
union workers*; the coverage is not considered wide enough 
to permit benefit payments of sufficient size to cushion 
a recession. 
4. Caut"ious hiring, expansion, and 
investment policies 
The enviable standard of living in this country 
has been made possible by men who were willing to take 
business risks in the hope of making substantial profits. 
There is no •~ place for unnecessary caution in a 
* 14,. P• 64 
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dynamic economy; unwarranted hesitancy will serve· only 
to quicken business downturns and impose another obstacle 
in the pa. th of government measures to haul the economy 
up during a recessio~ry period. 
a.· Hiring policies 
Union forces ar:e·, J.tnde.r.$tanQ.a.bly insulted when 
it is charged that the union initiated supplemental 
unemployment bene.f'i ts plans will lead to cautious hiring . 
policies. for they are dedicated to keep the avenues of 
employment open for their members. However• it is reason-
able to believe.that employers will not attempt to carry 
' -. 
an excessive workforce when they will be faced with 
unemployment benefits payments in the event of a layoff. 
Employment statistics from the Detroit area shows an 
increase in overtime work in the automobile industry 
in comparison with 1955·* It seems logical to assume 
that unemployment benefits pa~nents are one of the in-
centives behind the management decision to resort to 
overtime work in ;1eu of hiring additional workers, 
because overtime per.mits expansion and contraction of 
production with a minimum o£ variance in the workforce. 
Professor Slichter takes an opposite point of view, 
however. He believes that the effect of the unemployment 
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benefits on employment will be negligible because market 
forces causing employers to expand or contract operations 
are much stronger than the limited cost of the supplement• 
al unemployment benefits paymentso* This may well be 
the case, for a full year's seniority is required before 
' 
employees become eligible for the payments and even then 
the small amount of credit units accumulated by the new 
employees disappear at a fast rate as benefits payments 
are made. Therefore the supplemental unemployment 
benefits cost is truly "limited" for the employer in 
respect to the newly hired employee. 
' b. Expansion of existing facilities; use of 
new venture capital 
The theory that w~ge guarantees will cause manage-
ment to be hesitant to expand existing production facilities 
or to invest savings in new business ventures is predicated 
on the assumption that it will be costly to lay-off the 
new employees needed for such activiee, thus constituting 
a cost factor which could easily sway the decision against 
expansion or investment. This theory is much more valid 
in respect to a guaranteed annual wage than in relation 
* 34, P• .302 
to supplemental unemployment benefits plans, for as we 
have seen, the limited cost of the unemployment programs 
in laying off low seniority workers is not sufficient to 
be a major factor in a dec•.i.Sion to expand or invest. 
e_ Technological Advancement 
A force stronger than the limited cost of the 
unemployment programs is required to stall the inherent 
love of american business for something new and different. 
Whether the research department is profitable or not, the 
possibility that the department might someday turn up an 
extremelt_·,.profitable new product prevents management from 
liquidating that department. For those two reasons, then, 
the l~mited cost of unemployment benefits (the benefits 
cost being a deterrent to expansion resulting from research) 
and the gambling nature of' management, it seems logical to 
conclude that research activities will not be substantially 
curtailed as a result of the unemployment programs. 
D. E.ffect on Automation 
The ultimate effect of the plans on automation may 
be to hamper the installation of automatic machinery 
during recessional and normal economic periods and to 
quicken the rate of installation during prosperity 
or periods of plant expansion. Unless'the macdline in 
question is particularly efftcient, the benefits cost 
resulting from payments to the workers displaced by 
the mach!ne will act as a strong deterrent to the 
installation of the machinery. However, during periods 
of plant expansion, the 'company may install the new 
equipment without necessarily discharging the displaced 
worker. This is true since most u~employment benefits 
plans permit the employer greater .f'reedom in shifting 
employees to other than their regular work, o:r to other 
plants in the same labor market area.*. Therefore, the 
plans will have the effect of' influencing tlu~.h:t~'fl.ing o:r 
automation more strongly than the overall rate of auto-
mation installation. 
E. Savings for the Firm 
It is doubted that the benefits plans will result 
in appreciable savings for the firm. 1he production 
and personnel savings resulting from elimination of pro-
duction peaki:kland-:_,llal~e;;a ';bylthe benefits plan would 
have to be greater than the cost or the plan for a net 
savings to result. Because the limited cost of the 
plan is not deemed sufficient .financial .incentive to 
* 2, P• 12 
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force most inci'tistr:t:es to appreciably change production 
and sales policies, tt is not likely that a net savings 
will result. This !e ts direct contrast to the effec~ 
of .full guaranteed annual wage plans on savings • for 
it is telt that a guaranteed annual wage will elicit 
sufficient financial incentive to cause a major overhaul 
of production pblicies which will result in net savings 
/ 
:tor some £1rmso It must be remembered that :·~n·ot .all 
. 
industries are in a position to take advantage of savings 
resulting.&om sinootbly proportioned production. For 
example,· the can industry is highly seasonal; peak 
demnd for the metal containers occurs immediately after 
produce harvests. Continental Can Company representatives 
have frankly stated that they hesitate to produce for 
stock during slack periods (in order to proportion pro• 
duction rates) because a poor farm year would ruin the 
market for cans.• 'rhus the large inventory of cans 
would be only partially sold and the .Continental Can 
Company would be burdened with a large inventory mainte• 
n~nce expense and a large amount of capital tied up in 
inventory until the nexe season. In conclusion, 
company's which produce bulky products, ;:·products for which 
consumer demand is likely to shift (through style 
changes. seasonal demand, ;,or due to substitution or 
obsolescence) or products composed of raw materials 
that fluctuate in price are likely to require a much 
stronger incentive to proportion production than the 
limited wage cost of the supplemental unemployment 
b€nefits plans. 
F. Employee: .. :Mobility 
Is the security of unemployment benefits payments 
sufficient to hold the employee at his.present job ·and 
'. 
prevent him from seeking more remunerative employment 
in other industries? Perhaps a full guaranteed annual 
wage would result in employee immobility, but it is 
felt that supplemental une~ployment benefits payments are 
insufficient to hold most employees to their jobs if 
prospects of better employment appear. Even if the 
employee left the dubious safety of seniority under an 
unempl~yment program, he would still be eligible for 
~ 
state unemployment compensation, which is the lion's 
share o£ the total unemployment compensation he would 
' . 
have previously been in a position to receive. The 
program will foster intra-company employee mobility and 
ma.y possibly foster inter-company employee mobility, 
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although the latter is questionable. Intra~company 
mobility is aided by the contract stipulation that 
the company gains the right to shift employees to 
other than their regul:ar work, or ·to other plants in 
the same labor market area.* Also, there is the 
possibility that inter-company mobility will be furthered 
if the companies can cooperate on a system o£ hiring 
each otherst laid-off employees. Although this would 
reduce the company's unemployment benefits bill, it is 
doubted if the competitive nature of industry will allow 
cooperation of this type among employers. The state 
law stipulation that the employee must accept other 
available work, if suitable, as a condition precedent 
to eligibilty for state unemployment compensation will 
also tend to increase inter-company mobility.** 
G. Employee Initiative 
The benefit levels were held at sixty and sixty-
\ 
five percent of ~ake-home pay for the dual purpose o£ 
preserving a substantial pay differential in favor of 
those who remained at work, and·to give the dismissed 
\ . 
employee incentive to find other employment during the 
lay-off period.))~~* The state stipulation of actively 
* 2, P• 12 
** 34, P• 303 
*** 7, P• 10 
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seeking and accepting suitable work prior to unemploy-
ment compensation eligibility is another force which 
causes dismissed employees to seek work while laid-offQ 
The strongest force, however, is the pay d1£ferentialo 
Except in the comparatively few cases of unresponsible 
bachelors, workers (and their wives) will soon realize 
that sixty percent of former pay is not enough to main-
tain their former standard of living. Debt ridden 
families need full wages to meet installment payments 
on furniture, appliances, and automobiles; their posi-
tion in the community cannot be maintained by only 
sixty percent of their former income. It is strongly 
felt then, that as long as unemployment wage benefits 
are substantially below full wages, the desire and need 
for the lost pay differential will supply the dismissed 
worker with sufficient incentive to seek work, after the 
lapse or a short "resting" period., 
Ho State Unemployment Compensation Systems 
The argument that supplemental unemployment benefits 
plans will sabotage state unemployment compensation 
systems by taking away the dismissed worker's initiative 
to find other work is proven fallacious by the preceding 
discussion. Since jobless employees o£ the same company 
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receive the same pereentage'of pay regardless o£ what 
. state they live in, . one effect of the plans is to min-
imize the large differential which now exists in the 
unemployment compensation payments or the various states. 
Oompanyw1de collective bargaining has already narrowed 
the interstate wage differentials of plants in the same 
company. Supplemental unemployment benefits compensation 
now narrows the interstate unemployment insurance differ-
ential.• Another effect o£ the plans. on state unemploy-
ment compensation systems is to incite business to attempt 
to cause legislation which will raise the level of state 
benefits, thus reducing ~he unemployment benefits bill 
o£ the compan$,ee •. The .following quotation indicates the 
extent to which business lobbyists have been successful 
in raising state benefits levels. 
"A~ready· since September,l954. when corporations 
.first recognized that the United Auto: Workers were going 
to negotiate some kind of. Quaranteed Employment Plan, 
. ' 
unemployment compensation has been increased in thirty• 
, five o:f the .forty-eight states ... an average of $5.18 
or seventeen percent per week in maximum benefits for 
covered workers."** 
* 34, P• .301 
** 1, P• 19 
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The unions have been trying for years to cause legisla-
tion that would raise the level or state unemployment 
insurance benefits. As the foregoing statement verifies, 
't#he unions are now e.i'fecti vely using the company unemploy-
ment bene£1 ts plans to cause business lobbyists to per-
suade legislators of themerits o£ increasing state un-
employment benefits# 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS 
We have seen that pure guaranteed annual wage plans 
may aggravate recessional periods by placing heavy coste 
on business during poor times, dampen the rate of tech-
nological advancement, reduce incentive for personal 
advancement, and reduce the effectiveness of state 
unemployment compensation systems. It is .felt, however, 
that because of limited cost, predictable liability, and 
benefit payments below one-hundred percent of. take-home 
pay, the above criticisms do not apply.to current supple-
mental unemployment benefits programs. If and when unions 
fully.~achieve their stated goal of one-hundred percent of 
take-home pay, the benefit plans will be dan~erous:ty·siJhi ... 
lar to pure guaranteed annual wage agreements and will im-
pose the same adverse effects on society and on the 
economy. 
The future of the supplemental plans, from the union 
point of view, appears bright. ~he spread of the plans 
has been greatly fostered by intra-industry and inter-
industry bargaining and by the limited liability r~ature. 
The limited liability factor, made possible by the stipu-
lation that five cents per employee hour worked shall 
constitute the only cost to the employer, allows the 
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employer to predict the cost of the program ••••• thus 
reducing one of the major obstacles in the path of the 
growth. or the plans, i.e., the fear of exorbitant costs 
in the event of an.uncontrollable and substantial lay-o:ff. 
As would be expected• minor administrative problems 
have appeared; after the problems have been solved, the 
plans may penetrate to many lucrative fields as yet un• 
touched. 
The union drive for a reduced work-week constitutes 
the only valid threat to the growth of the plans. It is 
reasonable to a.ssume that the unions will negotiate for 
a shorter work-week at the firs~ strategic opportunity. 
They will argue that technology and automation have made 
a four day work-week possible. The.employers will contend 
that price competition for the product just will not per• 
mit a four day or thirty-two hour work-week. A compromise 
will be decided upon and the union chiefs will then atte~:pt 
to improve upon the reduced work-week at subsequent nego-
tiations. 
The shorter work-week negotiations will have the 
e££ect of reducing union emphasis oh supplemental unemploy-
ment plans. The union negotiators will settle for a 
smaller increase inbene£1t size and duration than they 
would agree to in the absenc~ of the reduced work-week as 
a negotiation item. 
96 
• 97 
It is felt that the unions will allow the reduced 
work-week to take precedence over the supplemental benefits 
plan because the union membership will be able to evalu-
ate the advantages of the for.mer much easier than the 
latter plan. The advantages of the reduced work-week 
are obvious, but the advantages o£ the supplemental plan 
are contingent on a lay-orr •• ~···something that may never 
happen to the higher seniority employees. It follows, 
then, that since the union membership pay the salaries 
of and elect the union officers, the officers will allow 
the decreased work-week a priority position on the nego-
tiation agendao 
The trend of the plans is toward higher benefits, 
more stringent eligibility requirements, and benefits 
of longer duration than the original plan of the automo .... 
bile industry. The trend may eventually nullify the 
feature of limited cost and predictable liability, the 
very thing that differentiates the plans from guaranteed 
annual wage agreements. Because of these features, the 
adverse effects of the plans on the automobile industry 
and on the economy have been negligible and beneficial 
ef£ects have been created. Whether the unions will 
negate the beneficial effects by achieving a guaranteed 
annual wage is an interesting but unanswerable question. 
Perhaps the bargaining skill of management, or legisla-
tion, or both, may smother the guaranteed annual wage 
enthusiasm. 
The supplemental unemployment benefits agreements 
are but one more step in an endless trek towards allowing 
the worker a larger and larger share of the business 
bountyo It is gratifying to realize that Karl Marx's 
prediction# seems more fallacious with each step of the 
trek.o 
When Henry Ford and Walter Reuther pioneered the 
first supplemental unemployment benefits plan in a major 
United States' industry, they did more than bargain for 
five cents of a wage package; they laid the groundwork 
for a new area of management - employee social respect 
and equalization. 
# Karl Marx predicted that the working class of a capital-
istic system of enterprise would be so exploited by the 
owners of the factors of production that the workers 
would ultimately rebel against their country's economic 
systeme · 
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